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Analysis · DeFi

How liquidations work on Ethereum lending markets, and when they stop working

An over-collateralised loan is closed by a stranger who repays part of the debt for a bonus. The system works only while that trade stays profitable, which is exactly what a crash puts at risk.

By Etherelysium Editorial TeamUpdated 18 November 20263 min read

How liquidations work on Ethereum lending markets, and when they stop working
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Over-collateralised lending is the largest category of DeFi on Ethereum and the one whose failure mode is most often misread. The mechanism is short. The conditions under which it fails are not.

The loop

You deposit collateral into a lending pool and borrow less than it is worth. The pool tracks a health measure: collateral value, discounted by a per-asset liquidation threshold, divided by debt. In Aave v3’s documentation, a position with a health factor below 1.0 is “eligible for liquidation”. At that point a third party, usually an automated bot, repays part of the debt and receives collateral worth more than it repaid. The difference, the liquidation bonus, is the whole incentive. Aave’s documentation adds a rule for small leftovers: if less than 1,000 US dollars of debt would remain in the target reserve, the liquidator must repay all of it.

Interest rates in these pools are set by formula from utilisation, the share of deposits currently borrowed. High utilisation means high rates, which pull in deposits and push out borrowers. It also means depositors cannot all withdraw at once, because the assets are lent out.

Why the bonus is a design decision

Too small, and bots do not act, because the profit does not cover gas plus the risk of losing the race to another bot. Too large, and borrowers are punished for brief volatility. The bonus has to stay attractive under stress, not only in calm markets. A crash is exactly when gas is most expensive and when competition for block space is fiercest. Aave’s documentation states the rule bots follow in a single line: liquidate only when the bonus exceeds gas costs.

Three routes to bad debt

Bad debt is debt larger than the collateral backing it. Someone absorbs it: a reserve, a treasury, or depositors.

  • Price moves faster than the machinery. Collateral falls far enough between price updates that a position goes from healthy to underwater without passing through a profitable liquidation point.
  • The collateral cannot be sold. A liquidator receives collateral it must then sell. If on-chain liquidity for that asset is thin, selling moves the price against it, so it does not act. The position is liquidatable on paper and untouched in practice.
  • Congestion. Liquidation transactions compete with everyone else reacting to the same move. On Ethereum, the base fee can rise by at most 12.5 percent per block under EIP-1559, but a sustained run of full blocks compounds that quickly, and the priority fee needed to win ordering has no cap.

The parameter that matters most

Attention usually goes to the collateral ratio. The more informative parameter is the price feed: how often it updates, how large a move triggers an update, and what the protocol does if it stalls. A generous buffer with a slow feed can be worse than a tight buffer with a responsive one, because the buffer exists to absorb the price move that happens between updates. Our explainer on oracle design and staleness covers that side.

Correlation matters as much. If the collateral and the borrowed asset tend to fall together, the crash and the liquidation arrive at the same time. A liquid staking token borrowed against ETH looks safe until the token’s market price slips below the ETH it represents; that gap can trigger liquidations without ETH itself moving.

The Settlement Test

  • What settles: the liquidation transaction itself, on Ethereum or on the L2 where the market lives: debt repaid, collateral transferred, bonus paid, all in one atomic transaction.
  • What it costs: for the borrower, the bonus handed to the liquidator. For the liquidator, gas plus the risk of selling the seized collateral at a worse price. Current gas readings are on our gas and fees page.
  • What breaks: a stale or manipulated price, a collateral asset nobody wants to buy, or blocks too full to land the transaction. When all three happen together, bad debt follows.

Reading a lending market’s risk

Which assets are accepted as collateral, and how deep is their on-chain liquidity in a bad week rather than a good one? How concentrated are the largest positions? Where do prices come from and what happens when the feed stops? Can a liquidator close part of a position, or must it close all of it? Is there a funded mechanism for absorbing bad debt? None of this is a recommendation to use or avoid any protocol; it is a way to read the machinery. For background, see MEV, since liquidations are among the most contested transactions in any block.

Primary sources

Educational content, human-edited and possibly AI-assisted. It describes how systems work and is not financial, legal or tax advice. Report an error via our corrections page.

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